John Bennett Walters, Total War, and the Raid on Randolph, Tennessee by Anderson, Thomas Lee
Western Kentucky University
TopSCHOLAR®
Masters Theses & Specialist Projects Graduate School
8-1-2009
John Bennett Walters, Total War, and the Raid on
Randolph, Tennessee
Thomas Lee Anderson
Western Kentucky University, thomas.anderson@yahoo.com
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.wku.edu/theses
Part of the United States History Commons
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by TopSCHOLAR®. It has been accepted for inclusion in Masters Theses & Specialist Projects by
an authorized administrator of TopSCHOLAR®. For more information, please contact connie.foster@wku.edu.
Recommended Citation
Anderson, Thomas Lee, "John Bennett Walters, Total War, and the Raid on Randolph, Tennessee" (2009). Masters Theses & Specialist
Projects. Paper 87.
http://digitalcommons.wku.edu/theses/87
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
JOHN BENNETT WALTERS, TOTAL WAR, AND THE RAID ON  
RANDOLPH, TENNESSEE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A Thesis 
Presented to 
The Faculty of the Department of History 
Western Kentucky University 
Bowling Green, Kentucky 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In Partial Fulfillment 
Of the Requirements for the Degree 
Master of Arts 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
By 
Thomas Lee Anderson 
 
August 2009
  
 
 
JOHN BENNETT WALTERS, TOTAL WAR, AND THE RAID ON 
 
RANDOLPH, TENNESSEE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                          Date Recommended:  June 12, 2009   
 
    _____Glenn W. LaFantasie______ 
        Director of Thesis  
  
 
      _____Carol Crowe-Carraco_____ 
 
 
      ______Robert V. Haynes_______ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_______________________________________ 
Dean, Graduate Studies and Research           Date 
  
i 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
 
 
I wish to gratefully acknowledge a Graduate Student Research Grant from the 
Office of Graduate Studies and Research at Western Kentucky University which enabled 
me to visit Tipton County, Tennessee to do first-hand research into the history of 
Randolph.  Sarah Kessler helped smooth the application process for me and Dr. Eric 
Reed took some of his valuable time to support my presentation. 
Nancy Baird and Nancy Marshall, of the Western Kentucky University libraries, 
provided encouragement, ideas, and patience above and beyond their job descriptions for 
which I am grateful.  Selina Langford helped smooth the way to many resources through 
the Inter Library Loan office. 
I also want to thank Sharon Timbs and Kate Byrd at the Tipton County Library in 
Covington, Tennessee, who went out of their way to help me complete my research. 
Dr. Robert V. Haynes and Dr. Carol Crowe-Carraco improved this thesis every 
time they touched it. 
Finally, without the help and support of Professor Glenn W. LaFantasie, who 
gave me all the room I needed to develop my own ideas, and make my own mistakes, 
even when they sometimes rubbed him the wrong way, this thesis would not have been 
possible.  Thanks Dr. L. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
ii 
 
JOHN BENNETT WALTERS, TOTAL WAR, AND THE RAID ON 
 
RANDOLPH, TENNESSEE 
 
 
Thomas Lee Anderson  August 2009    37 pages 
 
Directed by:  Glenn W. LaFantasie, Carol Crowe-Carraco, and Robert V. Haynes 
 
Department of History     Western Kentucky University 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
The regnant interpretation of the American Civil War includes the fact that it 
evolved into a “total war,” which adumbrated the total wars of the twentieth century.  
Mark E. Neely, in 1991, published an influential paper calling this interpretation into 
question for the first time.  In the article Neely revealed that the first mention of “total 
war” in connection with the Civil War was an article written in 1948 by John Bennett 
Walters about Gen. William T. Sherman and a raid he ordered on Randolph, Tennessee in 
reprisal for an attempted hijacking of the packet boat Eugene on the Mississippi River. 
Walters castigates Sherman’s raid as brutal, cruel, and wanton and tries to depict 
Sherman as a violent and hateful man who set out to punish Southerners for turning their 
backs on the Union.  He—along with modern residents of Tipton County, Tennessee—
claim that Sherman burned the whole town to the ground.  But a close investigation of the 
target of Sherman’s attack shows that Randolph, Tennessee had been a ghost town since 
the mid 1840s with the result that very little actual damage was done.  There may have 
been as many as six dwellings in the area along with dozens of abandoned and derelict 
buildings.  Sherman’s orders to the troops were to let the citizens know that Union 
officials abhorred this kind of violence but were forced by guerilla activities to burn their 
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homes to discourage continued attacks on river boats.  The residents were given sufficient 
time to remove their belongings before the buildings were set afire.  
The results of this investigation suggest that the raid on Randolph might be 
emblematic of much of the purported devastation of the South by Sherman and his 
armies.  Perhaps the “total war” on the South was illusory and has been greatly 
exaggerated along with the destructiveness of the Civil War.  The term “total war” seems 
never to have been used in the nineteenth century.  Total war is a twentieth-century term 
and is completely bound up with twentieth-century technology, especially with aircraft as 
weapons of mass destruction.  The kind of destruction encompassed by “total war” was 
unimaginable in Civil War times, especially the deliberate killing of noncombatant 
civilians.  It is argued, then, that the use of the term “total war” to describe the American 
Civil War is anachronistic and thus entails the projection of twentieth century realities 
into the past.  
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JOHN BENNETT WALTERS, TOTAL WAR, AND THE RAID ON 
RANDOLPH, TENNESSEE 
 
It never occurred to historians prior to World War II to ask whether or not the 
Civil War was a total war, but since that time the question has been asked frequently and 
mostly answered in the affirmative.  The view that the Civil War was a “total war” has 
gained the acceptance of most Civil War historians.  Because this interpretation is so 
widespread, few historians explain what it is that they mean by “total war.”  They take for 
granted that readers will understand the term.  For instance, T. Harry Williams, a highly 
respected historian of the Civil War, used “total war” in the first sentence of his 
influential book, Lincoln and His Generals.1   But he fails to explain what he means by it, 
and the term does not appear again until one of his final chapters, where he again does 
not bother to explain what he means.  Apparently he, like many other Civil War 
historians, finds the term unproblematic and assumes that everyone knows what “total 
war” means and how it applies to the Civil War.   
Despite its relatively wide acceptance, some historians, writing in the wake of the 
Vietnam conflict, saw that the Civil War did not necessarily begin as a “total war,” even 
if it seemed to end that way.  These historians argued that it started as a “limited war” and 
then progressed to a “total war.” Many, perhaps most, historians now view this 
transformation from limited to total war as central to a basic understanding of the Civil 
                                        
1
 T. Harry Williams, Lincoln and His Generals (New York:  Knopf, 1952), 3, 261. 
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War.  This “total war hypothesis” is the dominant view among Civil War historians in the 
twenty-first century.   
Mark E. Neely, the earliest and most steadfast of the critics of the total war 
hypothesis, has argued that the concept of “total war” was somehow “in the air” 
following World War II and that this accounted for the wide and uncritical acceptance 
among historians of the term “total war.”2  Neely simply meant that the term was in wide 
use and that most educated people understood what it meant—it meant a war in which 
civilians were targeted by enemy military forces and in which no restraints were 
acknowledged.   Neely’s critique of using the term “total war” to describe the Civil War 
appeared first in an influential 1991 article in Civil War History.  More than anything, 
Neely pointed to how historians had uncritically accepted the term and had repeatedly 
misused it in their accounts of the Civil War. 
What Neely did not specifically mention, but which adds to the problematical use 
of “total war” to describe the Civil War, is the tendency of historians to use the term in 
various and imprecise ways. This conceptual fluidity makes analysis difficult, for 
meanings need to be teased out from context, a process that necessarily involves another 
layer of interpretation.  And even when the term is addressed explicitly, historians still  
employ the term in radically different ways.  A case in point may be found in Phillip 
Shaw Paludan’s A People’s Contest, in which he argues that Sherman had “waged total 
war against the property, not the lives, of Confederate citizens.” Thus he suggests the 
                                        
2
 Mark E. Neely, “‘Civilized Belligerents’:  Abraham Lincoln and the Idea of ‘Total War,’” in 
John Y. Simon and Michael E. Stevens, eds., New Perspectives on the Civil War:  Myths and Realities of 
the National Conflict (Madison, WI:  Madison House, 1998), 9; Neely, “Was the Civil War a Total War,” 
Civil War History 37 (April 1991): 1-25.  For Neely’s detailed critique of the “total war” thesis, see also 
Neely, The Civil War and the Limits of Destruction (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2007). 
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possibility that total war can actually, in such an instance, be a “partial, total war.”  Other 
historians, such as Professor Harry S. Stout, disagree and insist on a harsher definition of 
“total war.”  According to Stout, the Civil War was “a total war on the Confederacy that 
deliberately targeted civilian farms, cities, and—in at least fifty thousand instances—
civilian lives.”3  
Neely suggests three reasons for the rise and acceptance of “total war” by scholars 
to describe the Civil War.  One flows from the “extravagant threats of violence [that] 
ruled political debate, much military correspondence, and the journalism of the Civil War 
era.”  The language of the Civil War was often unrestrained even though the behavior of 
leaders and soldiers generally was not.  This fact “helps explain the erroneous impression 
of the nature of the Civil War that now dominates the field”—that it was “total” and 
unrestrained.  Another factor that helps explain the wide and uncritical acceptance of this 
idea, says Neely, derives from the emphasis on social history that emerged in the 1960s 
and continues to attract a good number of Civil War historians.  In writing about Civil 
War combat, social historians have focused increasingly on the individual soldier, a point 
of view which, out of necessity, emphasizes the horrifying violence and destruction that 
soldiers on the front line witnessed, usually more than once.  By emphasizing the role of 
individual combatants, some historians greatly exaggerate the violence of the Civil War, 
which was no more or less violent than, for instance, the Napoleonic Wars.   War did not 
change; historians writing about war changed.  A third factor, Neely argues, may be that 
historians after World War II felt that the Civil War had been romanticized for too long, 
and they sought to remind their readers that war is awful; that war is bloody, destructive, 
                                        
3 Phillip Shaw Paludan, A People’s Contest (New York:  Harper & Row, 1988), 304; Harry S. 
Stout, Upon the Altar of the Nation: A Moral History of the Civil War (New York: Viking, 2006), xvi. 
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and violent; that war produces dead and dying people and horses and body parts piled up 
in bloody, filthy messes at the end of a smoking battle.  War is not heroic; war is not 
glorious; war is not a storybook adventure.  People needed to know that.  Still, Neely 
suggests, a subtle presentism might have crept unwittingly into historians’ efforts to 
describe the violence of the Civil War.4  
According to Neely, the first historian responsible for applying the term “total 
war” to the Civil War was John Bennett Walters, a Southern historian who received a 
Ph.D. from Vanderbilt University in 1947, just two years after the close of World War II.  
In 1948, Walters published an article, “General William T. Sherman and Total War,” that 
attempted to demonstrate how Sherman, while serving in Memphis in the summer of 
1862, began to conceive of a new philosophy of war, a philosophy of “total war,” by 
which Walters meant “a plan of action which would destroy the enemy’s economic 
system and terrify and demoralize the civilian population.”  Walters sought to make his 
case against Sherman by examining how troops under his general command had burned 
the community of Randolph, Tennessee, in September 1862.  In Walters’s formulation, 
total war consisted of two elements—attacks on the enemy’s economic ability to make 
war, and “the use of military force against the civilian population of the enemy.”  Walters 
further believed that “total war” also encompassed a moral component, since, in his view, 
“total war” was waged with willful disregard for the civilized standards of war and the 
protections that civilized nations universally offered to civilian noncombatants in the 
                                        
4 Neely, Civil War, 215-218.  John Keegan, a military historian, notes:  “All battles are, in some 
degree, and to a greater or lesser number of the combatants, disasters.  Waterloo was a disaster of very 
considerable magnitude.  Within a space of about two square miles of open, waterless, treeless, and almost 
uninhabited countryside, which had been covered at early morning by standing crops, lay by nightfall the 
bodies of forty thousand human beings and ten thousand horses, many of them alive and suffering 
dreadfully.”  See Keegan, The Face of Battle (New York:  Penguin Books, 1976), 199. 
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nineteenth century.  In other words, total war—and particularly the kind of war fought by 
Sherman against the Confederacy—was immoral, an extreme form of warfare that went 
against the norms of decency as recognized by the civilized world.5 
To prove his point, Walters emphasized “[Sherman’s] new concept of the 
employment of terror against the armies and the civilian population alike.”  He referred to 
Sherman’s military actions in West Tennessee as an “experiment in terror.”  Terrorism 
and terror, of course, are not neutral words; they carry with them large measures of moral 
opprobrium.  And that was precisely what Walters wanted to communicate by using those 
highly charged terms.  What was more, morally loaded claims abounded in Walters’s 
assessment of Sherman.  “Under [Sherman’s] tutelage,” wrote Walters, his soldiers 
“learned to direct their hatred against the people of the South and to visit upon them the 
savage art of destruction and the disregard for human rights and dignity which the rules 
of war had sought to mitigate.”  Walters frequently used the language of Lost Cause 
ideology to underscore Sherman’s lack of moral restraint and how Southerners suffered 
as victims under his hand.  For example, he described Sherman’s march to the sea and 
beyond as “the application of his philosophy of total war on a grand scale . . . marked by 
                                        
5
 John Bennett Walters, “General William T. Sherman and Total War,” Journal of Southern 
History, 14 (November 1948): 1-25.  Apparently Walters wrote only this one essay during his career as a 
historian and an educator.  In 1973, he took the text of his dissertation at Vanderbilt, on which the article 
earlier published in the Journal of Southern History was based, added a new preface, and published it as a 
book about Sherman.  See Walters, The Merchant of Terror: General Sherman and Total War 
(Indianapolis:  Bobbs-Merrill, 1973).  Walters did no additional research during the intervening twenty-five 
years.  In reviewing this book, Sherman biographer John Marszalek complains that “[i]nstead of analyzing 
Sherman, Walters indignantly castigates what he characterizes as unnecessary brutalization of a defenseless 
people and the resultant causation of generations of hatred.”  Marszalek suggests that with a little more 
research and a little insight, Walters might have discovered that Sherman was not a “vicious merchant of 
terror” at all, but “a pioneer in the use of psychological warfare.”   See Marszalek, Journal of American 
History 61, No. 3 (Dec. 1974): 785.  Mark Grimsley, however, claims that Marszalek “follows Walters’ 
basic interpretation” in Marszalek’s own biography of Sherman: Sherman: A Soldier’s Passion for Order 
(New York:  Free Press, 1992), 194-196.  See Grimsley, The Hard Hand of War: Union Military Policy 
Toward Southern Civilians, 1861-1865 (Cambridge and New York: 1997), 115n. 
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a trail of burned houses, needless destruction of the necessities of life, and the wholesale 
theft of private property.”  According to Walters, upon arriving in South Carolina, 
Sherman “resumed his campaign of terror on a more extensive scale.”  Wherever 
Sherman went, Walters wrote, “wanton waste, arson, looting, and other indignities [were] 
visited upon the defenseless citizens by a ruthless soldiery.”6 
Even if Sherman’s “total war” tactics may have helped win the war, Walters 
insisted that the Union general made the post-war healing far more difficult by 
brutalizing Southern civilians: “The utter helplessness of the victims of such brutality, 
forced to stand by while humiliations and indignities were heaped upon them, left lasting 
scars upon the memories of those so mistreated.”  Walters claimed that Sherman “could 
view his first full-dress performance in total war with satisfaction.”  In the wake of 
Sherman’s army,” he said, lay “unrestrained pillage and destruction.”  As it prepared to 
leave Atlanta, Sherman’s army, in Walters’s estimation, was ready “to apply the concept 
of total war with a zeal which only hate could inspire and a thoroughness which 
represented the culmination of two years of experience in destruction.”  Sherman’s army, 
asserted Walters, “left behind them a trail of terror and desolation, burned homes and 
towns, devastated fields and plundered storehouses, and a record for systematic torture, 
pillage, and vandalism unequalled in American history.”7   
For John Bennett Walters, then, Sherman’s total war involved “terror” against 
defenseless citizens and “the savage art of destruction”; total war was “terror and 
desolation”; it was “systematic torture, pillage, and vandalism” and “needless 
                                        
6
 Ibid., 465-467, 470-471. 
 
7
 Ibid., 472-473, 476, 478-479. 
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destruction.”  Sherman taught his soldiers to hate Southerners and to rob them of their 
human rights and dignity and to brutalize them and visit upon them “unrestrained pillage 
and destruction.”  Walters repeatedly castigated Sherman’s so-called “total war” tactics 
as both criminal, inasmuch as they violated the rules of war, and unethical, since they 
violated community standards and basic human rights.  And, in Walters’s account, there 
is the added sense that total war was inescapably more destructive, more violent, more 
deadly, more vicious, more awful, more savage, more hateful, more brutal, than other 
kinds of war.  Although historians have sometimes not explicitly disclosed the sense in 
which they use the term “total war,” it is often this last characteristic of terrible war—
what one might call “really, really awful war”—that they seem to mean.  Walters, as it 
turns out, is not alone in using exaggerated description to evoke the horrors of total war.  
Similar language abounds in the Civil War literature right up to current times.8 
If Walters overdramatized Sherman’s actions and the effects of war, how might 
we begin to size up the difference between the reality of Union warfare and the extreme 
rhetoric Walters uses to describe it?  One place to start is with the rules of warfare that 
existed before and during the Civil War.  Indeed, it is important to note that all of the 
“protections” guaranteed to civilian noncombatants by the rules of war—rules which 
Walters claims Sherman crassly ignored—existed under international law prior to the 
Civil War and were conditional upon the behavior of the noncombatants.  General Orders 
100, “Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field,” 
                                        
8
 See, for example, James M. McPherson, “From Limited War to Total War,” in Drawn with the 
Sword: Reflections on the American Civil War (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 66-86.  This 
essay was originally published as “From Limited to Total War:  Missouri and the Nation, 1862-1865,” in 
Gateway Heritage, 12 (1992), 4-19.  Both versions of the essay were intended as McPherson’s answer to 
Neely’s “Was the Civil War a Total War?” 
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signed by President Abraham Lincoln on April 24, 1863, clarifies the essential 
conditionality of the rules governing the behavior of Union troops toward Confederate 
civilians, even though those rules were not formally promulgated until later in the war.  
Nevertheless, the generally accepted rules of war specified that noncombatants were to be 
protected only if military necessity permitted.  For instance, General Orders 100 provide 
that “the noncombatant or civilian population should be free from all violence or 
constraint other than that required by military necessity.” Another rule recognized what 
today would be called “collateral damage” by stating that “the unarmed citizen is to be 
spared in person, property and honor as much as the exigencies of war will admit.”  These 
protections did not extend to those who took up arms against the occupying forces.  
According to Union General Henry W. Halleck, who in 1861 wrote a textbook on the 
international law of war, “So long as they refrain from all hostilities, pay the military 
contributions which may be imposed on them, and quietly submit to the authority of the 
belligerent who may happen to be in military possession of their country, they are 
allowed to continue in the enjoyment of their property, and in the pursuit of the ordinary 
avocations.”9  It was left to the military commanders of occupied areas to judge the 
meaning of “military necessity” and “the exigencies of war.” 
Walters hoped to lay bare the process by which Sherman’s plan for total war was 
developed, but it actually became one of the weakest elements in his article.  For 
instance, in his attempt to elucidate the process by which Sherman formulated his 
                                        
9
 General Order 100, April 24, 1863, U.S. Department of War, The War of the Rebellion:  A 
Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Army, 130 vols. (Government Printing 
Office: Washington, D.C., 1880-1902), Ser. 3, 3: 148-164 (hereinafter, O.R.); Henry W. Halleck, 
International Law; or, Rules Regulating the Intercourse of States in Peace and War (San Francisco:  H. H. 
Bancroft & Company, 1861), 427.  Italics mine.  Walters also cites these General Orders and Halleck’s 
comment in “General William T. Sherman,” 447-448. 
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presumably immoral and violent philosophy of war, Walters maintained that the answer 
could be found in Sherman’s “own personal background of failure and frustration, out of 
which had come both an extreme sensitiveness to criticism and an impelling desire to 
attain security.”  Walters believed that Sherman sought to overcome earlier accusations 
of his insanity in Kentucky and his combat mistakes at Shiloh by carrying out brutalities 
against Confederate soldiers and civilians.  He also pointed to an alleged cognitive 
anomaly that afflicted Sherman—an anomaly, if Walters is to be believed, that led the 
Union general to leap “over wide gaps of fact and reason and to proceed on the basis of 
his inspirations and convictions with the utmost faith in the soundness of his 
conclusions.”  It was this cognitive deficiency, Walters argued, that led Sherman to 
conclude that small groups of guerillas rather than regular Confederate soldiers were 
committing the frequent acts of violence and destruction in West Tennessee against 
Union military assets.10   
But Walters, in making this psychological diagnosis, relied on Sherman’s 
bombast and the general’s own proclivity for immoderate rhetoric, something which 
Neely has identified as one of the possible sources in the evolution of the “total war 
hypothesis.”  Walters quoted a famous line from one of Sherman’s letters to his brother, 
Senator John Sherman of Ohio, written in August 1862:  “It is about time the North 
understood the truth.  That the entire South, man, woman, and child are against us, armed 
and determined.”11 From this and other statements made by Sherman, Walters 
constructed his case for the general’s “hatred” of Southerners and his development of a 
                                        
10
 Walters, “General Sherman,” 452, 458. 
11
 Sherman’s letter quoted in ibid., 460-461. 
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plan of terror against them.   But Walters made broad claims regarding Sherman’s 
attitudes and mental processes without taking into account that the Union general was not 
alone in his ideas and attitudes, that other people in similar circumstances shared these 
attitudes and ideas. 
The problem of contending with hostile citizens in occupied territory was not, for 
example, something that only Union officers had to face.  Confederate General Edmund 
Kirby Smith, who was operating in Unionist East Tennessee around this same time, 
confronted similar partisan activity against his forces.  On August 20, 1862, while 
Sherman and other Union commanders faced guerilla attacks on their patrols and on 
Mississippi River shipping, Gen. Kirby Smith issued a bulletin to the citizens of Knox 
County in eastern Tennessee and neighboring counties in southern Kentucky.  He warned 
Unionist citizens to remain in their homes and assured them they could go about their 
business as usual without fear.  “If, on the contrary, you persist in firing upon my soldiers 
from the woods, you will be hung when you are caught, and your houses and property 
will be destroyed.” 12  Because they spent less time in enemy territory, Confederate 
commanders did not encounter hostile guerilla activities as frequently as did their Union 
counterparts.  Nevertheless, whenever they ventured into Union territory they had to deal 
with the same general problems that frustrated Sherman.  Nor did the idea that all 
secessionists were enemies of the Union originate with Sherman.  Public opinion 
throughout the North held that secessionists were traitors, especially after the Confederate 
firing on Fort Sumter in April 1861. 
                                        
12
 Diary of Events, August 20, 1862, in Frank Moore, ed., The Rebellion Record, 11 vols. (New 
York: G. P. Putnam, 1864), 5:62. 
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But what mostly caused difficulties for Sherman—and what governed his reaction 
to hostile civilians—was the reality of attacks on Union shipping that occurred regularly 
on the Mississippi River along those portions of the river under Federal control.  Other 
Union officers found these attacks to be just as troublesome as Sherman did.  In August 
1862, General Benjamin F. Butler, the Union commander in New Orleans, sent the 21st 
Indiana up river to discourage guerillas who had been shooting at boats from the 
Arkansas side.  Ezra Read, the regimental surgeon, reported to Governor Oliver P. 
Morton of Indiana that the regiment routed a force of 500 Texas Rangers deployed on the 
west bank of the Mississippi River.  The Texans, said Read, were sent to protect guerillas 
who shot at boats on the river.  Union troops defeated an attempt by the Texas troops to 
ambush them, turned the tables, and captured almost 300 horses that had been ridden into 
the swamps and cane breaks and then abandoned.  The Texas Rangers, wrote Read, 
continued to flee on foot through the swamps.  Read clearly articulated his patriotism and 
devotion to the Union cause, but he also revealed his low opinion of secessionists:  “The 
twenty-first [regiment] will perform its part nobly and well.  It is for its country, first, 
last, and forever; and against every man and woman whose hands are against it, and 
against all men who will not sustain it in its terrible trials to sustain the best Government 
ever framed by human mind.”13  Read’s comment was less inflammatory than Sherman’s 
own rhetoric, but the underlying sentiment was the same—secessionist civilians, like 
Confederate soldiers, opposed the Union, and any good Union man was duty bound to 
oppose those Southerners in turn. 
Central to Walters’ thesis about Sherman’s development of a plan to wage “total 
war” against the Confederacy, including its civilians, is an incident that occurred at 
                                        
13
 Ezra Read to Oliver P. Morton, September 12, 1862, in ibid., 611-612. 
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Randolph, Tennessee in September 1862.  Sherman’s actions at Randolph, Walters 
claims, show that the general, after learning that some shots had been fired at a Union 
packet boat, began to wage “total war” against the civilian population of Tipton County 
by “ordering that vengeance be wreaked on the town because it happened to be near the 
scene of the trouble.”  According to Walters, Sherman responded to the report that the 
Union boat Eugene had come under fire near Randolph by ordering Col. C. C. Walcutt 
and his 46th Ohio Volunteers to burn most of the town, but to leave one house standing to 
mark the spot.  In this way, said Walters, Sherman intended to discourage further attacks 
on Mississippi River boats.  This action was, Walters claimed, an unrestrained use of 
military force against innocent civilians and it constituted a violation of the accepted 
rules of war.  He insisted that Sherman waged “total war”—the unrestrained use of 
military force against a civilian population—on hapless residents of Randolph, a town in 
West Tennessee, in Tipton County.  In Walters’s view, “all restraints were being cast 
aside.” 14  But did Walters provide an accurate account of what happened at Randolph?  A 
closer examination of the incident sheds new light on Sherman’s actions and on Tipton 
County in the autumn of 1862.  And it also gives some new meaning to John Bennett 
Walters’s interpretation of the affair. 
  
*            *            * 
 
On Tuesday, September 23, 1862, the packet boat Eugene, on its regular trip 
downriver from Cairo, Illinois, to Memphis, carried freight, passengers, U.S. mail, and 
                                        
14
 Walters, “General Sherman,” 462. 
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Union officers.  According to some reports, the Eugene had freight and two passengers 
bound for Randolph, but other sources claim the packet boat was decoyed into landing at 
Randolph by a man who hailed her from shore.  In any event, when the boat landed at 
Randolph at about 3 P.M., there was no one in sight.  The ship’s clerk, Mr. Dalzell, 
stepped ashore and headed up the hill to find out what was afoot.  Suddenly the doors 
flew open at one of the derelict warehouses at Randolph.  Out leapt a crowd of thirty-five 
armed partisans, led by a certain “Col. Faulkner,” who took Dalzell into custody.  Despite 
having a pistol held to each side of his head, Dalzell called out a warning to the Eugene.  
With this, the ambushers began firing at the boat as those on board attempted to take the 
Eugene back into the currents of the Mississippi River.  Women and children poured out 
onto the decks to see what was happening.  The captain and the pilot, who were also on 
deck, ducked for cover, and only the quick-thinking of the ship’s engineer, who 
scrambled under fire to reach the helm, allowed the Eugene to escape the armed attack.  
No one was injured, but there were dozens of bullet holes in the pilot house.  Upon 
reaching Memphis that evening, the crew, along with Union officers who had been 
aboard, provided Gen. Sherman with a detailed report concerning the attack on the 
Eugene at Randolph.15  As for Mr. Dalzell, the ship’s clerk, according to the unnamed 
reporter for the Louisville Daily Journal, he was taken to Col. Faulkner’s camp ten miles 
distant from Randolph where he was threatened with hanging and finally released and 
escorted back to the Randolph area.  The reporter pointed out that Faulkner and Dalzell 
were acquainted with each other through their travels on the river. 
                                        
15
 “Destruction of the Town of Randolph,” Louisville (KY) Daily Journal, September 30, 1862; 
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In Walters’s account, he criticized Sherman for jumping “to the conclusion that 
this attack was the action of guerillas, and casually brushing aside the possibility that it 
might have been made by Confederate soldiers.”16  But Walters ignored a great deal of 
evidence about the Randolph incident in order to level his criticisms of Sherman.  For 
example, the attack was made in broad daylight with dozens of witnesses on board the 
Eugene, none of whom reported seeing Confederate soldiers.  If the attackers were 
soldiers who were out of uniform then they were worse than guerillas, they were spies.  
Walters overlooked important parts of Sherman’s orders to Col. Walcutt of the 46th Ohio 
Volunteers.  While Sherman did order Walcutt to burn the town of Randolph (with the 
exception of a single house), he also instructed him to “let the people know and feel that 
we deeply deplore the necessity of such destruction, but we must protect ourselves and 
the boats which are really carrying stores and merchandise for the benefit of secession 
families, whose fathers and brothers are in arms against us.  If any extraordinary case 
presents itself to your consideration you may spare more than one house; but let the place 
feel that all such acts of cowardly firing upon boats filled with women and children and 
merchandise must be severely punished.”   Sherman also ordered Walcutt to have his 
quartermaster make a list of all property destroyed in the raid along with the names of the 
owners so that damages could eventually be paid if warranted.17   
These additional details about Sherman’s orders to Walcutt mitigate the view of 
“Sherman-as-terrorist,” which Walters urged in this article.  There are other details that 
Walters overlooked or, perhaps, purposely neglected.  How much damage was really 
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done at Randolph?  What size town was Randolph?  Were businesses targeted?  Was the 
economic system of Tipton County attacked? 
 
*            *            * 
 
Tipton County, Tennessee, where Randolph is located, was an agricultural county 
in the western part of the state where families raised cotton and corn and hogs, as they do 
today.  The western boundary of the county is the Mississippi River, and at one time 
(before 1837) some people in Randolph hoped their town would become a major 
shipping point for local cotton.  They aspired to compete with Memphis, a larger port 
forty miles downstream at the mouth of the Wolf River.   
When Tennessee held its referendum on secession in June 1861, the state voted 
almost 3 to 1 in favor of leaving the Union.  The city of Memphis did not wait for that 
vote; it seceded from the Union four days after the South Carolinians fired on Fort 
Sumter in April.  In Tipton County the vote on June 8, 1861 was 943 for secession to 16 
against.  All 16 “no” votes were said to have come from the hamlet of Portersville, where 
a few Yankee families had settled.  In 1862 Tipton County was a hotbed of Confederate 
feeling and of civilian resistance to Union efforts to pacify West Tennessee.18 
The town of Randolph was founded in the late 1820s.  Despite the desire of the 
settlers to create a place that would become a commercial rival of Memphis, especially 
during the times when Memphis was struck by outbreaks of yellow fever, the depression 
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of 1837-38 hit Randolph hard when the price of cotton sank to 8.5 cents per pound from 
17 cents.  In addition, a period of low water in the Hatchie River, which formed the 
northern and eastern boundaries of Tipton County, caused cotton to be shipped overland 
to Memphis rather than downriver to Randolph, creating more economic woes for the 
town.  The town’s only bank closed in 1837, while its newspaper, the Randolph 
Recorder, folded that same year.  Then a sand bar began to form at Randolph, a part of 
the natural process by which the Mississippi regularly alters its course, that made it 
increasingly difficult for steamboats to dock there.   Moreover, the bluffs began to 
collapse forming a series of huge “steps” 20 to 30 feet above each other.  Two other 
disasters struck Randolph:  The proposed railroad route through Randolph was relocated 
to Memphis, and a proposed canal linking the Hatchie and Tennessee rivers was killed by 
politics in 1832.  President Andrew Jackson, and others, opposed internal improvements 
funded by the federal government.19 
According to an area resident, Randolph “was the most flourishing business river 
town in West Tennessee on the Mississippi.”  He claimed that if the canal had been built 
connecting the Tennessee River with the Hatchie, Randolph’s growth would have been 
assured and Memphis would have remained forever, a “village at the mouth of the Wolf.” 
Alas, after the railroad route was lost to Memphis, Randolph’s businessmen moved 
downriver to Memphis, and “Randolph as it was, is now only in name, and lives alone in 
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the history of ‘Old Times in the Big Hatchie Country.’”  By 1845, Randolph was a ghost 
town.20  
Following the opening salvos on Fort Sumter, in April 1861, a letter from an 
unnamed Tipton County resident appeared in the Memphis Appeal suggesting that state 
authorities send troops and artillery to Randolph.  In the letter the author referred to 
Randolph as a “near deserted village that was once the mighty arch-rival of Memphis.” 
Randolph was, the writer claimed, the perfect place, high on the Chickasaw bluffs, from 
which to defend Memphis from an attack by Union forces on the Mississippi.  Tennessee 
Governor Isham Harris promptly dispatched Lt. Col. Marcus Wright of the 154th militia 
regiment at Memphis to Randolph where, on the site of the “near-deserted village,” Fort 
Wright/Fort Randolph was constructed.21  Some of the town’s derelict buildings provided 
lumber for the construction of warehouses, while an underground powder magazine was 
dug out of the banks of the Mississippi.  By early May it was reported in the Memphis 
Daily Appeal that 400 men were in training at Randolph.  At the end of May, soon-to-be 
Confederate Generals John Sneed and Gideon Pillow hosted a visit to Fort Wright from 
several Memphis-area ladies who were “sumptuously entertained.”22 
During the summer of 1861 officials from the Confederate national government 
came to Tennessee to take control of the troops and the defenses.  There was a great hue 
and cry from concerned citizens worried about the loss of local control, but they were 
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mollified by both Confederate and Tennessee officials who assured them of convergent 
interests.  In July Fort Wright was closed; the troops and equipment were moved upriver 
to Fort Pillow.  Randolph became once again a near-deserted village along the 
Mississippi. 
 
*            *            * 
 
Sherman, says Walters, “exploded into action” when he heard the report of the attack on 
the Eugene.23  By nightfall on September 24, 1862, the Ohio Belle and the Eugene were 
filled with the Ohio 46th Volunteer Infantry along with a battalion of artillery.  Sherman 
had suggested to Col. Walcutt, whom he placed in command of the expedition, that he 
send one boat past Randolph to see it would draw fire; if it did, Walcutt and his troops 
would know then what they were up against at Randolph.  The flotilla reached the area 
before daybreak on September 25.  The Ohio Belle landed Walcutt and his troops below 
Randolph while the Eugene steamed up the Mississippi as far as Fort Pillow without 
drawing any fire.   Meanwhile Walcutt and his troops reached Randolph without 
resistance.  They found no town, only a mostly deserted village with six houses and 
dozens of abandoned and derelict buildings left over from Fort Wright and from older 
projects at Randolph. 
The soldiers let the tiny number of women residents know their orders and the 
reasons for Gen. Sherman’s instructions to burn their homes.  The troops gave the locals 
a few hours to remove their belongings.  A relative of one of the women later wrote that 
the Yankees were very helpful—there was one woman who was bedridden so they came 
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to her assistance to move her and her possessions out of the house (and then, once she 
was gone, they helped themselves to such of her property as they desired).  Then the 
soldiers burned what buildings there were in the town, except for the single structure 
Sherman had ordered to be left standing.24  Although it was a sad and stressful day for a 
few West Tennesseans, the assault on Randolph cannot be said to be a prime example of 
what Walters—and later historians—would call “total war.” 
Walters saw this episode in a far different way: “While it was true that bands of 
guerillas were extremely active in the region around Memphis and that unorganized 
civilian resistance was frequently encountered, Sherman’s disposition to consider all 
resistance as treacherous acts of the civilian population prepared the way for the next 
steps in the development of his attitude on the conduct of the war.”25  But what Walters 
missed, or could not see, was that Sherman’s reprisal against Randolph was not a step in 
any grand scheme to wage war against the Southern civilian population, but was instead a 
response to real threats and incidents of violence against Union resources. 
Indeed, it was militarily prudent for Sherman to take into account all resistance 
that arose from Confederate military forces but also from the civilian population, since it 
was quite possible that Confederate soldiers might have disguised themselves as civilians 
or that civilians were actually operating in the area as guerilla fighters.  Sherman, as the 
commanding officer of an occupying force, did not have the investigative resources of a 
peacetime judicial system.  Nevertheless, he had to make decisions about protecting his 
troops and supplies; he also needed to maintain law and order in his jurisdiction.   
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*           *           * 
  
Is it accurate to view the episode at Randolph, Tennessee as a “total war” incident in 
which Sherman “cast aside all restraints?”  Sherman ordered Col. Walcutt to apologize to 
the citizens and explain to them why this disagreeable action had to be taken.  The Ohio 
soldiers provided sufficient time for residents to remove their belongings.  Walcutt’s 
quartermaster kept a record of the property that was destroyed, and it appears that only 
half a dozen homes were burned, along with dozens of abandoned and derelict buildings. 
It is important to keep in mind that “total war” is a twentieth-century term and is 
bound up with twentieth-century technology.  It was first used in the 1920s to describe 
the possibility of using airplanes to bypass the front lines to bomb an enemy’s homeland 
selecting both civilian and military targets.  This is neither a sufficient nor a necessary 
reason that “total war” cannot be used to describe the Civil War or even the incident at 
Randolph; but, because the term is so intimately connected to twentieth-century 
technology, it is difficult to use it accurately when applying it to anything that happened 
in the mid-nineteenth century.  In fact, comparing a well-documented “total war” incident 
with the incident at Randolph, Tennessee might be instructive.  
Late in World War II, on March 9, 1945, hundreds of B-29s streamed out of the 
Marianas loaded with napalm.  Their destination was Tokyo, the capitol of Japan.  With 
few military targets remaining in Japan, the strategic point of this raid was to burn Tokyo 
to the ground and inflict such horrifying casualties on Japanese civilians that the war 
would have to end.  “Within five months [in 1945],” writes historian Niall Ferguson, 
23 
 
 
 
“roughly two-fifths of the built-up areas of nearly every major city had been laid waste, 
killing nearly a quarter of a million people, injuring more than 300,000 and turning eight 
million into refugees.”  Eighty to a hundred thousand Japanese noncombatant civilians 
were burned to death on that March night in 1945.26 
That was “total war,” at least until the 1950s when the term acquired additional 
nightmarish qualities as the USSR developed its own nuclear arsenal.  The comparison 
between the fire bombing of Tokyo in 1945 and Randolph in 1862 (or even the Union 
army’s destruction of Atlanta or Columbia in 1864) must not stop at the obvious 
quantitative level, at the mere, sheer numbers.  For even if Sherman had been handed the 
wherewithal to instantly kill a quarter of a million Southerners, or maybe even a mere 
50,000, he probably would not have made use of such a destructive ability.  The kind of 
slaughter that occurred in Tokyo and in other places, including Hiroshima and Nagasaki 
in 1945, was unthinkable to anyone who pondered the destructive capacity of warfare in 
1862.  Humankind needed technological advances, like the machine gun, and massive 
political and diplomatic failures, such as occurred to bring on World War I and World 
War II, to enhance war’s destructiveness to a level of mass annihilation.  Seeing the Civil 
War, and the minor incident at Randolph in 1862, as unrestrained acts of brutality reveals 
how anachronistic Walters’s description of Sherman’s infliction of “total war” on the 
residents of western Tennessee actually is.  To read the destructiveness of the twentieth 
century—both in its moral and its technological significance—backwards into the 
previous century is to commit the cardinal historical sin of undermining “the integrity and 
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the pastness of the past.”27  No matter how much the world may need to hear about the 
dangers of war, no matter what moral message one has for the salvation of the world, no 
historian has the right to try to change the past.   
The concepts of “limited war” and “total war” are forever married to the twentieth 
century where the latter came to mean, during the Cold War, a war of mutual 
annihilation, a war in which multi-megaton missiles might blast human civilization back 
at least into the Stone Age.  The idea that this term “total war” ever had a legitimate 
application in our study of the American Civil War seems strange.  This historiographical 
anomaly may, just in its outlandish, comedic aspects, serve to advance Page Smith’s 
assertion in 1964 that “historical perspective,” our distance in time from an event, is no 
guarantee of fairness and balance.28 That William Tecumseh Sherman could be vilified as 
a terrorist for his raid on Randolph seems inexplicable when the evidence surrounding the 
event is taken into full consideration.  
 
*            *            * 
 
But it is also odd that Walters’s article should have influenced other historians to 
accept the description of the Civil War as “total war,” for there is no clear link between 
Walters’s exposition of the Randolph episode and the later use of the term by historians 
writing in the remaining decades of the twentieth century, despite Neely’s assumption of 
such a thread.  Neely believes that Walters’s thesis “was quickly adopted by T. Harry 
Williams, whose influential book Lincoln and his Generals, published in 1952, began 
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with this memorable sentence:  ‘The Civil War was the first of the modern total wars, and 
the American democracy was almost totally unready to fight it.’”  Skipping nearly forty 
years of intervening Civil War historiography, Neely also notes that historian Phillip 
Shaw Paludan asserted that “Grant’s war making” amounted to “total war” because he 
demanded the unconditional surrender of the enemy forces he defeated on the 
battlefield.29 But Neely’s observation turns out to be superficial.  Having used “total war” 
in the first sentence of his book, Williams did not use it again until page 261, and even by 
then, it was not entirely clear what he meant by “total war.”  The thread between Walters 
and Williams and Paludan is one of only appearances, not of substance.  Williams and 
Paludan both list Walters’s article in their bibliographies, but neither of these authors 
actually discusses Walters’s thesis or cites his article in their footnotes.  In fact, a strong 
case can be made the Williams and Paludan use definitions of “total war” that differ 
considerably from Walters’s use of the term.  
Another prominent Civil War historian, James M. McPherson, departs from 
Walters’s use of the term “total war,” but McPherson’s arguments have a bearing on a 
consideration of Walters’s claims about Sherman and the raid on Randolph because many 
Civil War scholars, influenced by McPherson’s high status in the profession, have 
followed him in concluding that the Civil War was, indeed, a total war.  McPherson’s 
interpretation reveals, to some extent at least, how Walters’s application of “total war” to 
Sherman and his actions in western Tennessee set the stage for the rise of the “total war” 
thesis in the second half of the twentieth century.  The point here is that scholars did not 
necessarily build on Walters’s thesis by laying one block at a time to erect the “total war” 
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edifice.  Instead, they have used and accepted Walters’s terminology without giving its 
anachronistic nature much thought.  McPherson is a case in point. 
Almost fifty years after John Bennett Walters wrote his article on “total war,” 
McPherson published an article in which he argues that the Civil War went through a 
transformation from a “limited war” to a “total war.”  He speculates that many historians 
have labeled the Civil War a “total war” because of “the devastation wrought by the war, 
the radical changes it accomplished, and the mobilization of the whole society to sustain 
the war effort.”  Absolute war and total war,” writes McPherson, both mean “war 
‘without any scruple or limitations,’ war in which combatants give no quarter and take no 
prisoners.”  But, McPherson allows at first that “in that sense of totality, the Civil War 
was not a total war.”  Quoting Neely, he agrees that no one in the Civil War 
“systematically” targeted civilians.  He echoes Neely’s point that the rhetoric of the Civil 
War “was far more ferocious than anything that actually happened” and that we need to 
look beyond the immoderate rhetoric to find what people actually did.  We must avoid 
judging the Civil War simply by what somebody said.  McPherson concludes that “those 
who insist that the Civil War was not a total war appear to have won their case.”30   
But, McPherson, despite having just acknowledged the victory of the critics of 
“total war,” suddenly reverses himself.  He maintains that phrases used by other 
historians, including “destructive war” and “hard war,” “do not convey the true 
dimensions of devastation in the Civil War.”  Instead, McPherson argues that for the 
people who lived through the Civil War, especially Southerners, the war “seemed total” 
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and therefore it was “total.”31  Although he strives to identify a commonality between the 
past and the present, McPherson only succeeds in applying an anachronism to the past.  
He labels the Civil War a “total war” because it produced a sense of dread and calamity 
among the people who lived through it.   
Despite his own shifting stand on the issue of “total war,” McPherson forges 
ahead with an analysis of “the evolution” that occurred between 1861 and 1865 and 
changed the Civil War from a limited war into a total war.  To begin with, he asserts that 
both sides, Union and Confederate, started with “limited” goals for the war.  But 
eventually, he says, the nature of the war changed and became “remorseless” and 
“revolutionary,” when Union policy began to target Southern civilians.  Echoing John 
Bennett Walters’s assessment of Sherman’s response to guerilla attacks in West 
Tennessee, McPherson writes:  “These operations convinced Sherman to take off the 
gloves.  The distinction between enemy civilians and soldiers grew blurred.  After fair 
warning, Sherman burned houses and sometimes whole villages in western Tennessee 
that he suspected of harboring snipers and guerillas.”  Then he even borrows a Sherman 
quote lifted from Walters’s book, Merchant of Terror, to prove that the Union general 
had taken up “total war” against the South.32 
In support of his “total war hypothesis,” McPherson merely recites the inherited 
and incendiary wisdom about the Civil War.  He writes of “the devastation and suffering 
caused by the army’s scorched earth policy in the South,” a policy that does not hold 
water when it comes to the incident at Randolph.  A hatred of Southerners, McPherson 
claims, “governed Sherman’s subsequent operations which left smoldering ruins in his 
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track from Vicksburg to Meridian, from Atlanta to the sea, and from the sea to 
Goldsboro, North Carolina.”  From this, McPherson concludes that “the  
kind of conflict the Civil War had become merits the label of total war.  To be sure, 
Union soldiers did not set out to kill Southern civilians.  Sherman’s bummers destroyed 
property; Allied bombers in World War II destroyed hundreds of thousands of lives as 
well.  But the strategic purpose of both was the same: to eliminate the resources and 
break the will of the people to sustain war.”33  According to McPherson, the Civil War, 
even though civilians were not systematically targeted, and even though the devastation 
done by Union armies appears to have been greatly exaggerated, qualifies as a “total war” 
because Sherman and Grant were willing to destroy whatever equipment and supplies 
might benefit Confederate forces, and because they hoped to intimidate Southerners into 
giving up their war-making.  But surely he is mistaken in equating the historical 
circumstances of the Civil War and World War II.  Surely the destruction in these two 
war differed in both degree and kind.  Surely McPherson is projecting the devastation of 
modern warfare back onto the Civil War, and in so doing is committing the historical 
fallacy of anachronism.  
There are four realities present in discussing the term “total war.”  Two are 
mental, or phenomenological, realities, while two are historical realities.  There is the 
way Civil War-era people experienced the war as a mighty and dreadful calamity.  There 
is also the way that twentieth-century people experienced World War II and the peril of a 
war of mutual annihilation in the decades after 1945.  Probably human psychology has 
not changed very much in one hundred fifty years, so we may safely speculate that these 
phenomenological realities may be very similar.  Having faced a dreadful calamity as the 
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result of war, twentieth-century people may be well positioned to understand the sense of 
dread and calamity experienced by people in Civil War times.  The third and fourth 
realities, the historical realities, are the two wars.  And just because these wars evoked 
similar states of mind in participants, it is not necessarily the case that the wars were the 
same. 
“Total war” is a product of the twentieth century.  The term seems never to have 
been used in the nineteenth century.  Historians do not agree on when the term first 
appeared, but there does not seem to be any disagreement about what it first referred to—
i.e., the possibility that technology (especially aircraft) made real for bypassing the front 
lines of a war to attack civilian and military targets within the enemy nation.  “Total war” 
reached an unholy sort of crescendo during World War II in the firebombing of Japanese 
cities and then in the use of atomic bombs against Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The term 
continued to evolve, and during the Cold War “total war” came to include the 
nightmarish idea of a “war of mutual annihilation” in which thousands of megatons of 
hydrogen bombs were poised everyday to destroy the entire human race and nearly 
everything else on the planet.  Few residents of the first world who lived through the 
1950s and the 1960s, and even later, could have escaped the dread and foreboding which 
infected our daily existence.  This aspect of “total war”—this idea of the total 
annihilation of the species—is what makes the term totally inappropriate when applied to 
the American Civil War, which was still a hundred years away from the technological 
possibilities of mass death and terror to which this term refers.  When historians use the 
term “total war” to describe the Civil War, they unintentionally project our modern 
horrors backwards a hundred or more years and assign them to the Civil War generation.   
30 
 
 
 
Perhaps we need to abandon this term “total war” in connection with the 
American Civil War. A new descriptive term is needed that does justice to the experience 
of people who lived through that war in their own time but that does not conflate the 
military realities of the Civil War with the specter of twentieth century nuclear war.   
 
*            *             * 
 
Mark Grimsley, in a history of the Union high command and its treatment of 
Southern civilians during the war, offers a term that avoids the anachronism of “total 
war” but accurately captures the intensity of the Civil War in all its aspects.  Grimsley 
suggests that the Civil War was actually a “hard war,” a term he borrows from Sherman’s 
own use of the phrase “hard hand of war” to describe the Union effort to destroy enemy 
armies and resources during the final phases of the contest.  Instead of a campaign driven 
by hate in 1863, as pictured by John Bennett Walters and other fans of the “total war 
hypothesis,” Grimsley detects rational policies and predominantly rational behavior 
among Union forces as they employed “directed severity” in attacking property that could 
be used by the Confederate war effort.  Homes and supplies for the civilian population, 
he argues, were generally spared by Union troops.  Northern troops were restrained far 
more often than they were unrestrained.34   
Grimsley identifies how Union military policy toward civilians in the rebellious 
states evolved over time.  The first phase of Union military policy toward civilians, a 
phase which Grimsley labels the “conciliatory” phase, was informed by the belief that 
widespread pockets of “Unionism” existed in the South and that these people remained 
                                        
34
 Grimsley, Hard Hand of War, 152. 
 
31 
 
 
 
secretly loyal to the United States.  If Southern civilians were treated well they would 
turn on the secessionists as soon as Union forces arrived in the neighborhood.  An 
important part of this policy was an explicit stance against interfering with slavery.  
Lincoln adopted this position from the beginning.  He even offered the South, in an 
attempt to stave off secession, a constitutional amendment guaranteeing noninterference 
in the peculiar institution in those states which already had slavery.  The “strategic 
dimension” of the conciliatory phase was to “detach Southern civilians from their 
allegiance to the Confederate government . . . through respect and magnanimity.”35  This 
conciliatory phase ended during the summer of 1862. 
The middle phase of Union policy, Grimsley maintains, was characterized by 
pragmatism and the lack of a strategic dimension.  Union military commanders on the 
ground “foraged when they needed to forage and retaliated when beset by guerillas, but 
otherwise viewed civilians as peripheral to their concerns.”36  Indeed, Sherman was in 
West Tennessee during this pragmatic phase.  Grimsley’s focus on the pragmatism 
behind Union military policy in the occupied South provides a more useful interpretation 
of Sherman’s actions than does Walters’s idea that the Union general was devising a 
“total war” policy at this time.  Sherman was clearly reacting to guerilla actions when he 
ordered the raid on Randolph, which is wholly consistent with the pragmatic policy 
Grimsley delineates. 
The preliminary Emancipation Proclamation, issued in September 1862, signaled 
an end to conciliation as Union policy, says Grimsley, and, following the middle phase, 
ushered in the “hard war” phase of Union military policy toward Southern civilians.  This 
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“hard war” phase began in the western theater in April 1863, but did not appear in the 
East until 1864 when Grant was elevated to general in chief.  Grimsley observes:   “The 
classic hard war operations that historians have found so striking had at least two main 
attributes.  First, they were actions against Southern civilians and property made 
expressly in order to demoralize Southern civilians and ruin the Confederate economy. . . 
. Second, they involved the allocation of substantial military resources to accomplish the 
job.”  This hard war phase had the same strategic dimension as the earlier conciliatory 
phase—“to detach Southern civilians from their allegiance to the Confederate 
government”—but a different approach to that strategy.  This time the approach was 
through “intimidation and fear,” rather than “respect and magnanimity.”37   
As compared to Walters’s interpretation of the Randolph raid as signaling the start 
of a total, unrestrained, barbarous, brutal and indiscriminate way of making war, 
Grimsley depicts instead the results of a policy of “directed severity.”38   He reveals that 
Union conduct in the war at the time of the Randolph incident was rational.  The Union 
had tried a conciliatory policy which, while rationally conceived, failed to accomplish 
what had been hoped for it.  It did not loosen the bonds that connected Southern civilians 
to the Confederate government.  A different policy, the “hard war” policy, still rational, 
was beginning to guide actions in the field after the failure of conciliation.  Sherman, and 
others, still hoped the Southern civilians could be alienated from their government, but 
this time they were going to try fear and intimidation.  In the end, their new policy 
worked. 
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*            *            * 
 
Grimsley asks a salient question that sits at the heart of this study:  “If the Union 
Military effort against Southern property was indeed discriminate and roughly 
proportional to legitimate needs, why have so many interpretations insisted for so long 
that it was indiscriminate and all-annihilating?”   In answering his own question, 
Grimsley suggests that interpretations of the war’s severity and brutality may have 
actually begun during the war itself and that they have served different agendas over the 
decades since. Perhaps, Grimsley says, this might explain the persistence of what Neely 
calls the “total war hypothesis.”39  One agenda that was obviously served by this view of 
the conflict was the Confederate agenda itself.  Confederate political leaders demonized 
Northerners, fearing a nascent longing for re-unionism among Southern civilians in the 
same way Union leaders hoped for it.  When Lincoln sent a supply ship to Fort Sumter, 
the Memphis Daily Appeal fulminated against the perfidy and mendacity of the “Black 
Republicans” in Washington D. C.  Confederate General P.G.T. Beauregard issued a 
strident proclamation in June 1861 warning that the Northern abolitionists had been 
thrown into northern Virginia “murdering civilians, seizing private property” and were 
intent on “committing other acts of violence and outrage too shocking and revolting to 
humanity to be enumerated.”40   
Much of the immoderate rhetoric of the “total war” adherents sounds as though it 
might have come from Jefferson Davis himself.  Grimsley provides a germane sample of 
Davis’ rhetoric:  “Jefferson Davis railed against ‘the savage ferocity’ of Union military 
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conduct. ‘The frontier of our country,’ he wrote in 1863, ‘bears witness to the alacrity and 
efficiency with which the general orders of the enemy have been executed in the 
devastation of farms, the destruction of the agricultural implements, the burning of the 
houses, and the plunder of everything movable.’”41 
Southerners continued these propaganda claims as a part of the Redeemer 
movement following the war.  Eventually they found their way into the accepted tenets of 
Lost Cause ideology.  These claims established that the South had been done an 
unspeakable wrong and had not been fairly defeated, for the North had conducted an 
immoral and destructive war against them.  Moreover, tales of the brutality of the North 
afforded many Southerners the opportunity to avoid remembering the destructive and 
draconian actions of their own government, as “when Grandpappy reminisced about how 
his team of prized horses had disappeared, he preferred to recall that Yankee vandals had 
done it—even if the real culprit had been a Confederate impressment agent.”42  Perhaps, 
Grimsley suggests, the perpetuation of the myth of destruction and pillage by Union 
forces deflects attention from the fact that secession is what brought on the war and it is 
the South’s fault that so horrible a war ensued as a result. 
Whatever the reason for the use of the term “total war” to describe the Civil War, 
it is now time to retire the phrase from our historical lexicon.  Grimsley’s “hard war” 
suffices to convey the bloody nature of a war that left 620,000 Americans dead (220,000 
combat deaths and 400,000 victims of diseases that ravaged camps on both sides) and 
tens of thousands more wounded.  Walters stepped beyond the bounds of historical 
evidence in ascribing the motive of “total war” to Sherman in the Randolph incident, just 
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as McPherson and other historians have exaggerated the entire war into a conflagration 
equal to the destructiveness of World War II. 
Historians would be far better served, in fact, by returning to the old work on 
Lincoln and his commanders written by T. Harry Williams.  What Williams 
accomplished in this book was a lucid and intelligent description of the Civil War’s 
course as a conflict that intensified as it raged on.  But his view of the war avoided any 
suggestion—despite his use of the term offhandedly in two passages of his book—that 
the Civil War was a “total war.”  Describing a war that began with faltering 
incompetence, for the Union was completely unprepared for war, Williams demonstrated 
how Lincoln’s unwavering insight into the objective of the war—the total defeat of the 
enemy’s armed forces—provided guidance through troubled times.  And he traced the 
slow, but steady, emergence of a modern command system in the Union war effort that at 
last provided the edge needed for a complete Union victory.  According to Williams, this 
command system emerged organically from the war efforts, from the trial and error 
process that commanders (and the commander-in-chief) must undergo when they are 
plunged into the maelstrom of war.  Williams saw no need to burden his account with 
twentieth-century concepts like “limited war” and “total war.”  Such terms offered no 
interpretive advantage, then or now.   
The concept of “total war” as applied to the Civil War is irrelevant.  What is 
more, it is an anachronistic intellectual artifact that serves only as an obstacle to our 
knowing and understanding the Civil War on its own terms. 
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